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Abstract 
Positivism has been used to establish a standard that Information Systems (IS) research must meet 
to be scientific. According to such positivistic beliefs in IS, scientific research should: 1) be 
generalizable, 2) focus on stable independent variables, 3) have certain ontological assumptions, and 
4) use statistical or quantitative methods rather than qualitative methods. We argue that logical 
positivist philosophers required none of these. On the contrary, logical positivist philosophers 
regarded philosophizing in general and ontological considerations in particular as nonsense. 
Moreover, the positivists’ preferred empirical research method was not a survey, but rather a 
qualitative observation recorded by field notes. In addition, positivist philosophers required neither 
statistical nor nonstatistical generalizability. At least some positivist philosophers also 
acknowledged the study of singular cases as being scientific. Many research orientations (e.g., 
single-setting research, examination of change, qualitative research) that are deemed “unscientific” 
by positivism in IS seem to be “scientific” (in principle) according to logical positivism. In turn, 
generally speaking, what has been justified as scientific by positivism in IS (e.g., requirements of 
statistical or nonstatistical generalizability, surveys, independent variables, ontological views) were 
either not required by logical positivists or were regarded as nonsensical by logical positivists. 
Furthermore, given that positivism is sometimes associated (or confused) with logical empiricism in 
IS, we also briefly discuss logical empiricism. Finally, realizing that certain influential, taken-for-
granted assumptions that underlie IS research are unwarranted could have ground-breaking 
implications for future IS research. 
Keywords: Positivism, Logical Empiricism, Logical Positivism, Philosophy of Science, IS 
Philosophy 
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1 Introduction 
Logical positivism (LP), also known as positivism, is 
a well-known philosophical movement (Laudan, 
1996). Arguably, the beliefs of positivism have 
influenced the information systems (IS) field more 
than any other philosophical “ism”. For example, in the 
year (2004), 27% of the MISQ articles justified their 
fundamental research assumptions either as in line 
with, or against, positivism. In the field of IS, 
positivism has been utilized to authorize common 
research assumptions—e.g., generalizability, survey 
research, and identifying stable independent variables 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Lee & Baskerville, 
2003). In IS, positivism has also been used to discern 
what constitutes scientific and unscientific research 
(Klein & Myers, 1999). For example, Lee and Hubona 
(2009) claimed that “positivism requires the social 
sciences to incorporate these elements [independent 
and dependent variables, quantitative data, inferential 




statistics] if they are to become as scientific as 
natural sciences” (p. 237). We assert that LP did not 
require any of these elements in order for a study to 
be regarded as scientific.  
Given that positivism is often used to establish a 
standard for scientific research in IS, it is critical to 
determine to what extent IS beliefs regarding 
positivism are actually supported by the philosophers 
who constituted logical positivism. We performed this 
task by first analyzing articles from six journals 
between 2002-2015 that justified their research as 
being in support of positivism, or against it. This 
resulted in a total of 278 articles. Our review of these 
articles showed that IS beliefs about positivism were 
shaped by several influential papers describing 
positivism. Unfortunately, these few influential 
sources of positivism are mainly based on misreading 
literature that describes LP. Perhaps due to such 
misunderstandings, the standard that logical positivist 
philosophers set for scientific research and philosophy 
is (generally speaking) very different than that 
presented by many IS articles. For example, what has 
been often regarded as unscientific in IS per LP (e.g., 
single-setting studies and qualitative observations), seems 
to be (in principle) acceptable to logical positivists. In 
turn, many assumptions in IS that have been justified as 
scientific according to the authority of positivism (e.g., 
discussion of ontological assumptions) either were not 
required by logical positivists, or were regarded as 
nonsense by logical positivists. 
Since positivism in IS research is sometimes conflated 
with logical empiricism (LE), we also briefly discuss 
LE, which can be seen as the “successor” of LP.  
Our findings challenge many influential and regulative 
IS beliefs about positivism. We urge future researchers 
studying IS philosophy to start reexamining the 
fundamental assumptions of IS research, including 
beliefs that have been assumed to be based on 
logical positivism, logical empiricism, or those that 
have been taken for granted.    
2 Positivism: A Very Short Story 
While August Comte first introduced the term 
“positivism” (Bourdeau, 2013), in the philosophy of 
science during the nineteenth century, positivism 
                                                     
1 Carnap, Neurath and Schlick seem to assume that scientists 
did not waste their time in metaphysical discussions. Carnap 
also believed that philosophy could learn from mathematics: 
“In contrast to the endless controversies among the various 
schools of philosophy, the results in mathematics could be 
proven exactly and there was no further controversy.” 
(Carnap, 1963a, p. 4). 
2 For example, “most of the propositions and questions to be 
found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical” 
(Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 4.003). 
commonly refers to the logical positivism movement 
(LP) originating in the early twentieth century. 
(Carnap, 1936; Laudan, 1968; 1996). Three figures 
were especially influential in the formation of the 
theses of LP: Moritz Schlick (founder of LP), Rudolf 
Carnap (first joined as Schlick’s assistant), and Otto 
Neurath (cofounder of LP) (Hempel, 1935; Uebel, 2014); 
the highly influential theses of positivism would not have 
been formulated without these key figures (Manninen, 
2002). These philosophers, and others, known 
collectively as the “Vienna Circle,” developed their ideas 
in weekly LP discussions occurring primarily during the 
1920s and 30s in Vienna. 
2.1 Speculative Philosophy is Nonsense, 
and Philosophy Must Learn from 
Science 
Logical positivists felt that many philosophical 
problems, especially regarding metaphysics (including 
ontology, i.e., existence and reality), are nonsense, a 
major source of philosophical confusion and therefore 
waste of time. For example, Carnap asked, “Can it be 
that so many men, of various times and nations, 
outstanding minds among them, have devoted so 
much effort, and indeed fervor, to metaphysics, when 
this consists of nothing more than words strung 
together without sense?” (Carnap, 1932a). Logical 
positivists wanted to stop empty philosophizing and 
suggested that philosophy should instead learn from 
the success of the sciences.1  
Logical positivist Schlick found that Wittgenstein’s 
(1921) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus offered a 
viable way to achieve this.2 The debate, influenced by 
Wittgenstein’s (1921) Tractatus in the logical 
positivists’ intense meetings, resulted in the most well-
known theses of LP, namely: (1) analytic/synthetic 
knowledge, and (2) a verifiable criterion of meaning 
(Schlick, 1932). 3  Even though textbook 
presentations of LP may regard these as the common 
theses of LP, Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick actually 
often had different views on the philosophy of 
science. Similar to textbook presentations of LP, 
this paper portrays the logical positivists’ views 
more coherently than they actually were. 
3  While the LP members had different influences, the 
analytic/synthetic thesis was influenced by Frege, Russell, 
Wittgenstein, and Gödel (Carnap, 1963a; Creath, 2017). The 
LP analytic/synthetic thesis viewed logic and mathematics as 
analytic, a priori, decided formally by following logical and 
mathematical rules. In turn, empirical claims were synthetic 
and had to be tested empirically in a certain manner, 
proposed by the verifiable criterion of meaning. Any other 







2.2 What are Metaphysics, 
Analytical/Synthetic, and the 
Verification Principle? 
Logical positivists (Carnap, Neurath, and Schlick) 
regarded metaphysical (e.g., ontological) considerations 
as the primary source of confusion and nonsense in 
philosophy. To remove such nonsense from philosophy, 
the logical positivists’ tactic sought to render metaphysical 
claims meaningless (Holton, 1993). How then do we 
recognize this meaningless metaphysics? What precisely 
constitutes metaphysics and meaninglessness? To describe 
the complex LP ideas to nonphilosophers, we simplify the 
ideas of LP as follows:  
1. Logical positivists did not require a new 
theory or new theoretical contributions. 
2. If a scientific claim (or “theory”) has a 
number of claims (hypotheses, propositions), 
each claim must be evaluated individually, 
one by one. 
3. Meaningful claims are either analytic or 
synthetic. 
4. Analytic claims can be (dis)proven by 
mathematics/logic. 
5. Synthetic claims can be shown to be 
true/untrue by using the verification thesis.   
6. Any terms/concepts that are not analytic or 
synthetic are meaningless, and should be 
removed from the claims. 
The logical positivists thus did not evaluate a set of 
claims (or a “theory” consisting of a set of claims) as a 
whole, but on a statement-by-statement basis, in order 
to determine whether each statement was meaningful 
or not. For LP, meaningful statements are either 
analytic or synthetic. Roughly speaking, the former 
means proven mathematically/logically, while the 
latter means tested empirically with observable and 
identifiable characteristics. How did the logical 
positivists separate the meaningful from the 
meaningless? Roughly speaking, the basic idea was to 
select a claim (hypothesis, proposition) and ask what 
the claim was fundamentally about. More specifically, 
does the sentence concern a mathematical or logical 
riddle (i.e., analytic)? If yes, then it should be provable 
by mathematics or logic. For LP, analytical statements 
could be validated independently of empirical 
experience (observations), i.e., on formal grounds 
(Uebel, 2014). If the claim is empirical, and the 
question is empirical in nature (i.e., synthetic), then it 
must be verifiable empirically. If that verification fails, 
                                                     
4 The verification idea was advocated especially by Schlick 
and it was influenced by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. We also 
suggest the interpretation that Schlick advocated verification, 
because he believed that the verification by observation (see 
e.g., Schlick, 1932) is a key scientific method. Neurath did 
not accept the verification thesis (Manninen, 2002). For 
then the scientific sentence is untrue.4 If the sentence 
is not empirical or mathematical (logical), then it is 
metaphysical, and the metaphysics should be 
eliminated from the sentence. 
What counts as verified? The version of the 
verification thesis that is known as LP’s verification 
criterion had an absolute requirement for verification 
(empirical test). A direct sensory experience—
observation—was required (later, an indirect 
experience was also accepted) (Uebel, 2013). 
Verification can be described by using observation 
characteristics and an observation sentence 
(Hempel, 1950, p. 42). For example, “this apple is 
red” is an observation sentence in which the apple is 
the object and red is the observable characteristic 
(Hempel, 1950). This sentence meets the 
requirement because the object and its color can be 
verified by direct observation (Hempel, 1950). 
2.3 LP and Its Alleged Demise 
Although the aim of LP was to have an absolute 
criterion that rendered successful science meaningful 
and metaphysics meaningless (unscientific), this 
proved quite difficult to achieve. Thomas Kuhn 
(1962), Willard Van Orman Quine (1951), and Paul 
Feyerabend (1975) showed that scientific theories, or 
even a single synthetic statement, necessarily included 
assumptions that were meaningless (metaphysical) 
according to LP (see Section 4.6: Objective Data 
and LP). Moreover, one could ask whether the 
principle of verification itself meets the verification 
or analytical/synthetic criterion. Indeed, verification 
is not analytic, but rather seems synthetic. Can we 
then create a test that shows that verification is the 
correct method? We can hardly even design such a 
test with an observable effect. Should we then 
regard verification as metaphysical and meaningless 
in the light of LP theses?    
Owing to these (and many other) problems, it was 
reported by Karl Popper (1934) and John Passmore 
(1967) that LP had been “killed.” The demise of LP has 
been attributed to influential criticisms of logical 
positivism, including those by Popper (1934), Quine 
(1951), Kuhn (1962), Feyerabend (1975), Norwood 
Russell Hanson (1958), and Wittgenstein (1958). 5 
However, before any of these works were published, 
the key members of LP had already abandoned the 
verification method as well as the ambition to establish 
an absolute criterion to separate “meaningful” from 
“meaningless,” and had also dispensed with any labels 
differences between Schlick and Neurath, see Hempel 
(1935). 
5 Also, Reichenbach’s critique of LP’s absolute verification 
requirement appeared in 1931 and later in 1938. 
Wittgenstein’s later thinking (1929 onward) can also be 
viewed as a critique of LP (Laudan, 1996; Stern, 2007). 




identifying them with positivism or LP (Carnap, 1942; 
Salmon, 2005). These famous LP theses 6  “died” 
primarily not due to Quine (1951), Hanson (1958), 
Kuhn (1962), or Popper (1934), but because the LP 
members themselves no longer believed in their 
absolute ideas, and abandoned them accordingly. 
However, Neurath’s LP views did survive critiques by 
Quine and Hanson (Cat, 2014; Manninen, 2002).7 
2.4 What Happened After LP? LP 
Philosophers Quit Positivism and 
Started Logical Empiricism  
This section discusses what happened after LP 
members rejected the basic tenets of LP. While the 
precise time that LP members rejected LP is debatable, 
Salmon (2005) noted that by 1935, all key members of 
the movement had “abandoned the designation of 
‘logical positivism.’ After that, logical positivism no 
longer existed” (p. 19). Internal critiques (especially by 
Neurath) spurred logical positivists to omit even the 
name “positivist” or “logical positivist,” and they 
started to use different developed doctrines they called 
“logical empiricism” (LE). This may explain why LP, 
the Vienna Circle, and the positivist approach are 
associated with logical empiricism in IS 8  (e.g., 
Evaristo & Karahanna, 1997; Lee, 1991). Such 
confusion between LP and LE may also explain why 
Carl Hempel and his deductive-nomological model 
have been regarded as positivist in IS (Evaristo & 
Karahanna, 1997; Lee, Briggs, & Dennis, 2014). To 
our understanding, Hempel, however, was a logical 
empiricist who did not play an important role in the 
development of LP theses.9 Nevertheless, given that 
LE is different from LP, exactly what is LE? 
There are many LE philosophers who disagreed on 
most, if not all, specific issues (Creath, 2017). We 
now turn to a brief description of the basic ideas that 
are attributed to LE, and introduce the foundational 
LE philosophers by dividing them into the following 
four groups (Creath, 2017): 
                                                     
6  E.g., analytic/synthetic, verification, separating 
meaningless and meaningful, regarding metaphysical 
questions as meaningless pseudoproblems. 
7 Quine’s (1951) critique of analytic/synthetic (first dogma) 
does not apply to Neurath’s LP. Quine’s critique (second 
dogma) of verification and the concern of theory-free 
observation applies less to Neurath (Uebel, 1997). Neurath 
noted how observations are theory-laden. 
8 A. J. Ayer’s (1936) writing on the Vienna Circle is also a 
potential source of confusion between LP and LE. Ayer 
admitted in 1979 that “the most important of the defects [in 
logical positivism] was that nearly all of it was false.” 
(Hanfling, 1996, p. 5). 
9 Hempel’s own work regarding LP has been a critique of LP 
(e.g., Hempel, 1950) or an explanation of Schlick and 
1. Ex-logical positivists (e.g., Carnap, Neurath) 
who began to refer to themselves as logical 
empiricists.  
2. The Berlin Group, led by Hans Reichenbach. 
3. Philosophers (e.g., Feigl, Gödel, Kaila, 
Nagel, Popper, Quine, Ramsey, and Tarski) 
who were at some point influenced by LP.  
4. Philosophers who were inspired or educated 
by the Berlin Group (e.g., Dubislav, Hempel, 
Lewin, von Mises, and Oppenheim).   
This classification (by Creath, 2017) constitutes a 
textbook simplification and identifies individuals who 
participated in LE themes at some point. For example, 
Popper classified himself as a “critical rationalist.” 
Eino Kaila utilized the term logical empiricism in 1926 to 
separate himself from logical positivism (von Wright qtd. 
in Uebel, 2013). Neurath also used the term logical 
empiricism (Neurath qtd. in Milkov, 2013), and 
Reichenbach formally introduced the term “logical 
empiricism” (Reichenbach, 1936). Reichenbach was a 
key figure in Berlin’s discussion group, referred to as 
“Berlin logical empiricism” (1936).10  
Milkov (2013) and Salmon (2001) claimed that a key 
movement from LP to LE focused on the logical 
analysis of the sciences, although this means different 
things for different LE philosophers11 (Milkov, 2013; 
Salmon, 2001). By 1920, Reichenbach had already 
introduced the method of the “logical analysis of 
science” (Reichenbach, 1920, p. 74). His Berlin logical 
empiricism group was closely aligned with the natural 
sciences and was in constant contact with scientists and 
mathematicians—the most notable being Einstein and 
Hilbert, respectively (Milkov, 2013). The Berlin group 
analyzed the newest scientific discoveries and 
discussed what philosophy could learn from these 
(Milkov, 2013). Moreover, Reichenbach (1951) 
believed that logical analysis, especially the 
axiomatization of different scientific theories, would 
help scientists to correct their theories, as scientists do 
not have time to make their theories logical or 
coherent. 12 Some LP members regarded such 
axiomatizations as metaphysical (Milkov, 2013).  
Neurath (Hempel, 1935). Hempel’s students named him as a 
logical empiricist who is “perhaps the most astute critic of” 
LP (Fetzer, 2014).   
10 From 1929 to 1933, until Reichenbach’s professorship was 
terminated—because he was accused of being half-Jewish—
and he moved to Istanbul (Siitonen, 2002).   
11  For example, even Reichenbach and Carnap viewed 
logical analysis differently (e.g., Reichenbach, 1936; 
Milkov, 2013). 
12 “Scientific research does not leave a man [a scientist] time 
enough to do the work of logical analysis, and that 
conversely logical analysis demands a concentration which 
does not leave time for scientific work—a concentration 
which because of its aiming at clarification rather than 






2.5 LE and Some of its Key Problems 
Numerous philosophers associated with LE continued 
their methods of logical analysis, but omitted the close 
contact with natural sciences that many of the LE 
founders advocated. One explanation for this is the 
professionalization of philosophy. Philosophy 
departments, which educated philosophers who did not 
have expertise in performing research, were widely 
established. Philosophy began to drift apart from the 
natural sciences, which raised concerns. A common 
concern was what McMullin (1970, p. 14) referred to 
as the “danger of logical escapism.” Specifically, it 
was asserted that the formal system-building and 
logical analysis had “become an end itself” (McMullin, 
1970 p. 14) and resulted in “exercises in logic” that do 
not serve the understanding of how successful 
scientists or science operate. Laudan claimed that the 
most prestigious philosophy of science journals 13 in 
the 1960s were dominated by logical empiricist articles 
that lacked “any hint of real science—whether 
historical or contemporary.” (Laudan, 1989, p. 10). 
Former LP member Herbert Feigl, who advocated the 
move from LP to LE (Feigl, 1963), criticized LE 
philosophers for referring to natural scientists (e.g., 
Newton and Einstein) inaccurately to suit their needs 
and bemoaned that they lacked a genuine interest in 
examining the scientists’ cases that they referred to in 
detail, which Feigl found constituted “inexcusable 
conduct” (Feigl, 1970, p. 3). Feigl (1970) confessed 
that he also had engaged in this sin earlier in his career. 
In addition, the widely cited “axiomatic philosopher” 
Hempel admitted later in his career that the 
axiomatization of science was less fruitful than he had 
previously believed (Hempel qtd. in Nolan, 2000, p. 
11). Feyerabend (1970, p. 172) claimed that the 
philosophy of science was closer to actual science 
during the time of the scientific revolution (the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries); whereas, since 
the advent of LE, much of the philosophy of science 
increasingly focused on building “beautiful but useless 
formal castles” (Feyerabend, 1970, p. 183).14  
Those philosophers who engaged in the natural 
scientific case studies and proposed philosophical 
theories based on them are sometimes referred to as the 
“historical school” or “theorists of scientific change,” 
and include Buchdahl, Cohen, Hanson, Stegmuller, 
Hesse, Kuhn, Lakatos, McMullin, Toulmin, 
                                                     
(Reichenbach, 1951, p. 123). Such logical analysis was the 
task of professional philosophers of science (ibid, p. 123). 
13 Laudan mentions Philosophy of Science and The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 
14 This could characterize much of the logical empiricism 
around 1940-1970. However, contemporary philosophy of 
science includes many philosophers whose philosophizing is 
based on actual cases of natural or social sciences.    
15 In addition to “historical school” or “theorists of scientific 
change,” naturalism emphasizes the role of (natural) sciences 
Feyerabend, Laudan, Shapere, and Sneed (Laudan, 
1989, p. 11; Laudan et al., 1986). 15  For these 
individuals, many key issues in the philosophy of 
science are not ultimately logical enigmas, but rather 
concern the historical-empirical scrutiny of actual 
scientific practice. This does not mean that conceptual 
analysis is not required. Instead, a philosophy 
explaining the success of the natural sciences must be 
able to show that its tenets match the actual science 
(Laudan et al., 1986). However, this group of 
philosophers disagreed on a number of specific issues, 
including whether it is sufficient to read science 
directly in publications, or whether the actual science 
behind these publications should be examined (Giere, 
1973; McMullin, 1970; Burian, 1977).  
Formal escapism in LE has also inspired criticism by 
those philosophers who did not necessarily associate 
themselves with the historical school, but nevertheless 
also saw a close connection between philosophy and 
the natural sciences. For example, shortcomings of the 
Hempel-Oppenheim deductive-nomological model of 
explanations (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948) have 
motivated philosophers to develop different 
mechanism-based explanations by examining different 
natural sciences (e.g., Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; 
Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000) and social 
sciences (e.g., Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). Function-
based explanations can also be added to this list 
(Godfrey-Smith,1993, 1994).  
Textbooks sometimes report LE as being “dead.” 
Many philosophers have put forward similar reports: 
“There are today only a few philosophers of science 
who would defend any major logical empiricist 
doctrines in anything like their original form” (Giere, 
1988, p. 28). Our opinion is that philosophical findings 
derived from specific scientific disciplines (e.g., 
biology, biochemistry, and medical research) have 
rendered questionable those LE doctrines that present 
universal views of science. Again, a classic example is 
the Hempel-Oppenheim model. The realization that 
individual sciences are different has led the philosophy 
of science to focus on increasingly specialized 
philosophies of sciences—e.g., the philosophy of 
social sciences, the philosophy of economics, the 
philosophy of physics, the philosophy of medicine, and 
the philosophy of biology. It is also important to note 
that the relevance of LE accounts, such as the Hempel-
in the philosophy of science. For example, Giere (1988), a 
naturalist philosopher, suggested that sciences do not need a 
distinctive philosophical foundation: “The people best 
equipped to engage in such pursuits are not those trained as 
philosophers, but those totally immersed in the scientific 
subject matter—namely scientists” (p. xvi). As with 
philosophical “-isms” in general, naturalism is not a 
homogeneous movement. 




Oppenheim model, have been seriously contested even 
in physics (Cartwright, 1983; Giere, 1988; Wayne, 
2011). Despite the critique, it is not too difficult to find 
contemporary philosophers who refer to “science” 
without presenting concrete scientific cases to justify 
their theses (in terms of scientific realism, for example, 
see Laudan, 1981). However, such philosophers may 
not refer to themselves as logical empiricists. On the 
other hand, there seem to be lines of LE research 
themes that are still active. Examples of this include 
Carnap’s probability views, which also involved 
cooperation with John Kemeny, who codeveloped the 
BASIC programming language in the 1960s. Perhaps 
an even more influential example in the philosophy of 
science is the logical empiricists’ division between 
discovery and justification, which continues to be an 
issue of debate. In questioning whether LE is dead, it 
is important to ask which philosophers and which of 
their theses should be considered LE. As a 
philosophical movement, namely as an “-ism,” LE 
may indeed be dead; however, a number of the 
individual theses continue to influence philosophy and 
the logic of mathematics.  
The answer to the question of whether LE is dead also 
depends on the perspective taken. Does the perspective 
consider how LE formulations help scientists? Or, is 
the perspective more aligned with that of school 
philosophy, in which new philosophical knowledge is 
appreciated in its own right, even though that 
knowledge may not be applicable to problems that 
scientists face today or will likely face in the future. 
2.6 Positivism Dispute 
In the 1960s, a positivism dispute occurred in which 
Jürgen Habermas (1977) accused Popper of being a 
positivist. The peculiarity of the dispute was that no 
member of the positivism dispute—including 
Popper—admitted to being a positivist (Frisby, 1977). 
Popper was a “critical rationalist,” and he declared 
himself to be the killer of positivism (in Popper, 1934). 
Popper replied to Habermas that if Habermas’s 
definition of positivism was accepted, then it would 
make Marx, Engels, and Lenin positivists (e.g., 
Popper, 1969, p. 300). The positivism dispute may 
explain why falsification, commonly associated with 
Popper, is mentioned in IS as part of LP (Evaristo & 
Karahanna, 1997; Lee, 1991). 
3 The Use of Positivism in 
Information Systems 
Many IS articles note that the majority of IS studies are 
positivistic. For example, Mingers (2001, p. 240) 
reported that 97% of the articles analyzed by 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) used “a positivist 
framework.” Evaristo and Karahanna (1997) noted that 
LP dominates North American IS research. The high 
rates of positivistic research above can be explained by 
the fact that these studies (Evaristo & Karahanna, 
1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991) classify, for 
example, survey research with independent variables 
as positivistic, irrespective of whether the authors 
declare themselves to be adherents of positivism. An 
alternative way of reviewing “positivism” in IS would 
be to examine those articles which utilize the terms 
“positivism” or “positivist,” to analyze what the 
authors mean by these terms, and to understand which 
are the most influential sources of positivistic beliefs. 



















Table 1. The Use of Positivism in Articles Published in the Basket of Six Journals (Number of Papers Referring to 
Positivism and Percentage of the Total Publications). 






































2015 4 9.30% 1 2.17% 4 10.53% 3 11.54% 2 7.14% 0 0.00% 
2014 2 3.77% 2 3.92% 9 20.93% 1 4.55% 5 13.89% 0 0.00% 
2013 13 18.84% 1 1.59% 11 26.19% 1 4.35% 3 10.71% 0 0.00% 
2012 6 8.57% 2 3.39% 10 28.57% 5 23.81% 4 11.43% 0 0.00% 
2011 4 7.27% 3 5.88% 9 18.75% 5 23.81% 3 8.57% 2 5.26% 
2010 8 18.60% 2 3.57% 6 16.22% 4 19.05% 1 3.13% 1 2.50% 
2009 7 14.58% 2 6.25% 3 7.14% 1 4.35% 1 3.33% 0 0.00% 
2008 5 12.50% 1 3.45% 12 27.91% 4 22.22% 4 12.50% 2 4.88% 
2007 4 10.81% 1 3.70% 8 14.29% 7 35.00% 3 9.09% 0 0.00% 
2006 4 8.51% 0 0.00% 9 8.51% 2 14.00% 2 5.71% 2 5.00% 
2005 2 5.71% 0 0.00% 1 3.45% 3 17.00% 2 14.29% 2 5.00% 
2004 8 27.59% 1 4.17% 3 13.64% 5 29.41% 2 11.11% 1 2.86% 
2003 3 11.11% 1 5.88% 4 19.05% 2 11.76% 4 26.67% 0 0.00% 
2002 3 9.68% 5 17.24% 1 4.76% 1 6.25% 2 28.57% 1 2.78% 
Total 73 11.65% 22 4.17% 90 17.24% 44 15.88% 38 9.52% 11 2.01% 
3.1 The Use of the Concept of Positivism 
in Top IS Journals 
We reviewed the Association for Information Systems 
Basket of Six journals—MIS Quarterly (MISQ), 
Information Systems Research (ISR), European 
Journal of Information Systems (EJIS), Information 
Systems Journal (ISR), Journal of the Association for 
Information Systems (JAIS), and Journal of 
Management Information Systems (JMIS)—for the 
period of 2002-2015 to determine whether they used 
the term “positivism” or “positivist”; if they did, we 
analyzed what was implied by these concepts. For 
example, in 2013, 18.8% of all of the articles published 
in MISQ and 26.2% of all of the articles published in 
EJIS referred to positivism (Table 1). The analysis 
shows that 73 papers in MISQ, 90 papers in EJIS, 44 
papers in ISJ, and 38 papers in JAIS referred to the 
concept during the 13 years. An interesting 
observation is that, in 2004, Weber, in his MISQ 
editorial, asked that authors stop viewing IS 
research through positivism and interpretivism 
(Weber, 2004). His request, however, has not 
stopped MISQ authors’ utilization of the term 
“positivism.” Next, we describe the key sources of 
positivistic beliefs in IS, based on the citations that 
were used by the 278 articles in defining positivism. 
3.2 Where Did the IS Ideas of Positivism 
Originate? 
From a total of 278 IS papers (found in MISQ, ISR, 
EJIS, ISJ, JAIS, and JMIS) for the period of 2002-
2015, 126 (45.3%) utilized the concept by claiming 
that they adopted it or positioned themselves against it. 
However, they did not explain what they meant by the 
concept nor did they provide any references related to 
positivism. Our analysis indicated that only one paper 
(out of 278) cited any philosopher who, based on our 
understanding, viewed himself as a positivist. Porra, 
Hirschheim, and Parks (2014) mention Comte, who 
first introduced the term “positivism.” So, the question 
then becomes from where do the positivistic beliefs in 
IS stem if the IS articles that we analyzed did not cite 
or name positivistic philosophers? For those papers 
that cited an article as the source of positivism (as 
mentioned, 45% did not cite anyone), Orlikowski 
and Baroudi’s (1991) paper was the most 
influential (23% of the analyzed IS papers used it 
to describe what positivism means), Klein and 
Myers’s (1999) study was the second most 
influential (used by 12.5% of the papers), followed 
by Walsham (1995) 10%, Lee (1991) 9%, Dubé and 
Paré (2003) 8.5%, and Eisenhardt (1989) 6.5%. 
Table 2 illustrates on which sources these papers, 
in turn, base their views on LP or positivism.




Table 2. The Most Influential Papers on IS Positivism and their Sources for Positivism. 
Most influential papers on IS 
positivism Reference papers that are cited for defining positivism 
Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) Chua (1986), Evered & Louis (1981), Galliers & Land (1987), Morgan (1980), Morgan & 
Smircich (1980)  
Klein & Myers (1999) Lee (1989), Yin, (1994), Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) 
Walsham (1995) Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) 
Lee (1991) Hempel (1969), Kolakowski (1968), Popper (1968) 
Dubé & Paré (2003) Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991), Devers (1999), Lincoln & Guba (1985), Lee (1989) 
Eisenhardt (1989) No reference for defining positivism 
 
The most influential source is Orlikowski and Baroudi 
(1991), who mainly refer to Chua (1986) as their 
source for positivism. 16  Chua (1986) associates 
positivism with the verification method (in 
comparison with the falsification method advocated 
by Popper). The verification method mentioned by 
Chua (1986) is a positivistic thesis, especially in 
Schlick’s view of LP (Schlick, 1932).  
The second most influential source is Klein and Myers 
(1999), who mainly refer to Orlikowski and Baroudi 
(1991), but also to Lee (1989). Lee (1989) has been 
cited as “positivistic” in IS literature. Nonetheless, 
although Lee (1989 p. 34) utilizes the “natural science 
model of social science,” logical positivism is only 
mentioned in one footnote. 
The third most influential source is Walsham (1995), 
who views positivism as a belief in objective data, and 
also as the opposite of interpretative research (p. 376). 
Walsham cites Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) as a 
source when associating positivism with “formal 
propositions, quantifiable measures of variables, the 
use of hypothesis testing, and drawing of inferences 
about phenomena from a sample to a stated 
population” (Walsham, 1995, p. 383).  
The fourth most influential source is Lee’s (1991) 
article. Lee (1991, p. 343) correctly points out that 
within LP there was a theme called “the unity of 
sciences.” In addition, Lee (1991) outlines a number of 
ideas, which he claims to be positivistic, e.g., 
“inferential statistics” and “four requirements of 
falsifiability” (i.e., relative explanatory power, 
hypothetico-deductive logic, the rules of formal logic, 
and survival) (Lee, 1991, p. 343-343, 347).  
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 546), who also influenced IS 
research in the use of positivism, defines positivism as 
“toward the development of testable hypotheses and 
theory which are generalizable across settings.”  
IS studies (in our sample) primarily used these sources 
when referring to the meaning of positivism. The 
analysis further suggests that many of the influential 
views on positivism in IS (e.g., Klein & Myers, 1999; 
Dubé & Paré, 2003; Walsham, 1995) are based on the 
first source, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991). Next, we 
describe the main beliefs that IS researchers 
associate with positivism, as determined through our 
analysis of their articles. 
3.3 How the Most Influential Papers on 
Positivism in IS Define Positivism 
We have identified the articles that have been most 
influential in terms of how positivism is defined by IS 
researchers. Next, we briefly describe how most of 
these influential papers on IS positivism “define” (or 
characterize) the term positivism, so that we can 
retrace how IS researchers understand positivism. 
Based on our review (see Table 1), the assumptions 
presented in Table 3 are repeated by IS scholars when 
they utilize positivistic research methods or when they 
state that their underlying assumptions are based on 




                                                     
16 A number of sources for positivism—such as Galliers and 
Land (1987), Morgan and Smircich (1980), and Morgan 
(1980)—make no use of the term “positivism.” Morgan 
(1980) discusses “functionalism,” but not positivism. 
Functionalism means objective and value-free social science, 
with the scientist distanced from the scene that he or she 
analyzes through the rigor and technique of the scientific 
method (Morgan, 1980). Morgan and Smircich (1980) do not 
mention positivism, but rather refer to objectivism. 
Objectivistic research believes in an exterior world that is an 
objective phenomenon that lends itself to direct observation 






Table 3. Assumptions Justified under the Philosophy of Positivism in IS Research. 
Assumptions References 
A priori fixed relationships within phenomena Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991), Klein & Myers 
(1999)*, Dubé & Paré (2003)* 
Formal propositions, quantifiable measures of variables, hypotheses and theory 
testing, and large-scale sample surveys and controlled laboratory experiments  
Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991), Klein & Myers 
(1999), Walsham (1995)* 
Independent and dependent variables Dubé & Paré (2003) 
Testing prior theories or hypotheses using “objective” data Walsham (1995) 
Testable hypotheses and theories that are generalizable across settings Eisenhardt (1989), Dubé & Paré (2003) 
Inferential statistics, hypothesis testing, mathematical analysis, and 
experimental and quasi-experimental 
design 
Lee (1991) 
Testing theoretical propositions against the rules 
of formal logic and hypothetico-deductive logic, and satisfying falsifiability, 
logical consistency, relative explanatory power, and survival 
Lee (1991) 
The objective physical and social world that exists independently of humans Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991), Dubé & Paré 
(2003)* 
Precise scientific concepts with fixed and invariant meanings Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) 
A passive, neutral, and value-free researcher Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991), Klein & Myers 
(1999), Dubé & Paré (2003), Walsham (1995) 
Social sciences should emulate the natural sciences Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991), Dubé & Paré 
(2003), Lee (1991) 
Validity and reliability issues as used in the natural sciences Dubé & Paré (2003) 
Note. Asterisk (*) indicates qtd. in Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991). 
 
Next, we explain the assumptions concerning positivism. 
4 Discussion of the Assumption 
Concerning “Positivism” 
Of the assumptions presented in Table 3, we argue, 
with certain reservations, that the only one that was 
quite correctly associated with the LP philosophy was 
“objective data” by Walsham (1995).17.Moreover, we 
accept the possibility that a priori fixed relationships 
within phenomena can be regarded as “positivistic” 
through specific laws (see Section 4.5). Next, we 
briefly summarize why the other assumptions (in Table 
3) are not in line with LP. 
4.1 Is Survey Research Positivistic? 
Logical positivists did not advocate survey research, 
nor was it their preferred method. Nevertheless, two 
issues are relevant in considering whether survey 
research can be regarded as positivistic. First, it is 
debatable whether a survey would qualify as 
                                                     
17 Rather than objective data, it would be perhaps better to 
say that there is an objective basis for observations. 
Nevertheless, Neurath might not have accepted this. 
18  Imagine that we test different systems/programs with 
different characteristics, and we define a system’s ease of use 
through these characteristics. Then, we could test whether 
verification by observation in LP terms. However, the 
more important issue that we discuss is that, if a survey 
were to count as a verification by observation, then the 
survey questions should refer to concretely identifiable 
characteristics (in order to be positivistic). For 
example, we assert that constructs measuring the “ease 
of use” by statements (e.g., “I find the system easy to 
use”) would be meaningless for LP philosophers, as 
they do not specify the precise system or software 
features. 18  We view survey studies that specify 
concrete system characteristics (in connection to ease 
of use) as “more positivistic,” than those that do not 
precisely specify the system features.19 Nevertheless, 
it is questionable whether any form of survey research 
that uses probabilities is “scientific” in light of LP. 
This is what we discuss next. 
4.2 Statistical Methods are not Especially 
Positivistic Methods 
Many of the IS beliefs about positivism relate to 
(probabilistic) statistical techniques and studies. 
these characteristics of ease of use are key in explaining the 
use of a system or application. 
19  As mentioned, if we apply the strict requirement of 
absolute verification or analytic/synthetic, then perhaps no 
study is positivistic. 




Statistical data analysis alone does not mean that the 
study is scientific from the perspective of LP. LP’s 
term analytical should not be confused with statistical 
research, if the particular statistical research ultimately 
concerns the examination of an empirical 
phenomenon. Moreover, it seems that probabilistic 
statements were not acceptable for logical positivists 
(von Wright, 1945). LP’s ambition was much higher, 
claiming that there should be conclusive evidence or a 
finite set of data that could be examined, in order to 
verify a statement (Hempel, 1950).20 
4.3 Are Qualitative Studies Positivistic? 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that whether 
or not qualitative studies are positivistic is unrelated to 
sample size or the utilization of statistics to analyze 
qualitative data. What then was the status of qualitative 
studies in LP? We argue that if we have to select a 
research method used in IS and favored by LP 
philosophers, then a strong candidate would be 
qualitative observation. Logical positivists (e.g., 
Schlick, 1932) provided a number of examples of how 
animals and planets are examined by direct 
observation using the naked eye or a telescope. 
Carnap and Neurath even outlined different protocols 
to record observations. Briefly, Carnap (1932b) 
viewed the protocol as short, “now it is raining hard.” 
Neurath asserted that the protocol sentence must be 
more exact, in that it must include references to time, 
the name of the observer, and the exact conditions. 
Neurath’s version of a protocol sentence was, “Otto 
Neurath witnesses rain in Viennastrasse 4 at 3 
o’clock, 11/11/1932” (Neurath, 1932; Nottelmann, 
2006). We regard Neurath’s protocol sentence as an 
example of qualitative field notes. 
4.4 Independent and Dependent 
Variables were not Especially 
Important for LP 
Based on our reading, LP philosophers did not require 
scientific statements to have independent (IV) or 
dependent (DV) variables. LP required empirical 
claims to have identifiable (observable) characteristics. 
For example, “this table is red” is an acceptable claim for 
LP, as long as we know to which table we are referring 
(and we know that red refers to color). This example (and 
                                                     
20 We suggest the following interpretation. Consider, “this 
table is red” versus “there is a 60% chance that this table is 
red.” The former claim is not probabilistic, while the latter is 
probabilistic. We believe that the reason that LP did not 
allow probabilities was that, by allowing probability, one 
could not have an absolute criterion that ultimately separates 
metaphysical claims as meaningless. 
21  For example, “Traditionally, the word ‘laws’ has been 
reserved for universally applicable, exceptionless 
generalizations” (Teller, 2004, p. 731). 
Neurath’s example of field notes above) also illustrates 
that LP philosophers accepted what IS scholars might 
refer to as descriptive (atheoretical) research. 
4.5 Fixed Relationships or Change? 
There are various ways to approach this issue. One way 
is to associate fixed relationships with scientific laws. 
The standard account of laws (around 1920- 1930, ca. 
up to 1970s) was that laws are strictly unrestricted 
universal statements, and hence deterministic.21 Such 
laws seem to assume fixed relationships. In IS, 
positivist researchers reportedly use experiments and 
surveys with inferential statistics to “discover causal 
laws” or “universal laws” (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991, p. 10). However, it is not clear how surveys 
using statistical (probabilistic) techniques can discover 
universal (100% exceptionless) laws. The other 
possible interpretation would be to claim that LP was 
not a movement that was for or against fixed 
phenomena. LP members highlighted the need to 
examine issues empirically and not look toward 
philosophy in deciding such matters a priori.22 Either 
stability or change can be acceptable for LP if it 
satisfies the verification principle.  
Finally, Neurath (1931, 1944) stresses dynamism and 
unpredictability. Neurath asserts that: (1) phenomena 
are highly complex; (2) we often lack the specific 
details to predict a singular act (e.g., at what exact time an 
earthquake will occur and what the precise impact will 
be); and (3) even a single act—which we often cannot 
predict—can cause enormous consequent events that are 
even more difficult to predict. For Neurath, prediction is 
theoretically possible in science (Reisch, 2001), but is 
impossible in practice (Reisch, 2001). 
4.6 Objective Data and LP 
Objective data, or rather an objective basis for 
observation, can be viewed as positivistic, especially 
according to Schlick’s positivism. Schlick’s 
verification thesis involved an observation that 
indicates whether an empirical statement is true or 
untrue with absolute certainty. According to this idea, 
a biochemistry scholar makes an observation through 
a microscope and draws a conclusion with absolute 
certainty. If there is absolute objectivity in the 
observations, then Schlick’s verification (1936) could 
22 Following this interpretation, a belief that relationships are 
a priori fixed would be a metaphysical claim for LP, which 
should be avoided. Neurath (1931) agrees that one should 
look to science to see how things are, and not engage in 
“philosophizing.” Hahn, a LP member, (1930/1980, p. 20) 
maintains that the role of philosophy is only to see that 
scientific propositions “are not pseudo-propositions” (Hahn, 






work as an absolute method. However, problems in 
establishing an objective basis for observation were a 
key reason that logical positivists destroyed their own 
movement. Demolishing the objective basis for 
observation is commonly attributed to the critics of 
LP—e.g., Hanson’s (1958) “theory ladenness of 
observation,” Quine’s (1951) underdetermination, and 
a number of theses by Feyerabend (1975) and Kuhn 
(1962). However, many years before Feyerabend, 
Hanson, Kuhn, and Quine, Neurath argued against 
Schlick that our observations are not independent of 
speculation. Specifically, any observation is 
inspired by our background beliefs, e.g., our own 
education, beliefs, speculations, theories. When 
these background beliefs change, the expected 
observation results may change as well.23 
4.7 Generalizability across Different 
Settings and LP 
Lee and Baskerville (2003, p. 231) claimed that “the 
study of a single setting (e.g., the setting of the fox in 
their reservation in Iowa) is an interpretive 
researcher’s objective,” but not a positivist’s objective, 
which is “generalizable across different settings.” 24 
We find this interpretation problematic. Logical 
positivists (e.g., Schlick, 1932) would have allowed 
the study of a “single setting (e.g., the setting of a fox 
in their reservation in Iowa)” (Lee & Baskerville, 
2003, p. 231). For example, Schlick (1932) provides 
examples of observational studies of (1) animals that 
only live in Africa, and (2) certain features of specified 
planets.25 Also, Neurath’s protocol sentences (Section 
4.3) allowed for the study of a single setting. 
                                                     
23 A concrete example would be primary brain lymphoma (a 
type of cancer). Under a microscope, the growth pattern 
(angiotropism) of primary brain lymphoma resembles 
sarcoma (a different type of cancer), and primary brain 
lymphoma was confused with sarcoma long before more 
specific ways to recognize it through a microscope were 
identified (Bhagavathi & Wilson, 2008). A scholar who has 
a “theoretical” understanding of the sarcoma, but does not 
have a knowledge of what primary brain lymphoma looks 
like under a microscope, may not be able to discern the 
difference between primary brain lymphoma and sarcoma. 
24  One way to defend “generalizable across different 
settings” (Lee & Baskerville, 2003, p. 231) as positivistic is 
to suggest that logical positivists advocated laws, and laws 
require generalizability. One problem with this approach is 
the following: The standard account of laws is that laws are 
100% exceptionless generalizations (Teller, 2004). It is 
questionable if IS research can have such generalizations. 
25 Schlick (1932, p. 484): “There is not the least doubt that 
the proposition ‘there is a 3000 meter mountain on the other 
side of the moon’ makes good sense, even though we lack 
the technical means of verifying it. And it would remain just 
as meaningful if one knew with certainty, on scientific 
grounds, that no man would ever reach the other side of the 
4.8 Ontological Questions were Nonsense 
for Logical Positivists 
Claims, e.g., “an objective physical and social world 
that exists independent of humans” (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991, p. 8), are ontological (about reality and 
existence). It is rather difficult to conduct such 
ontological discussions with the principles of LP—
e.g., “Is this a logical problem? If so, can you prove it 
logically/mathematically?” (analytical), or “Is this an 
empirical problem?” (synthetic). Anything that fails to 
satisfy these criteria is meaningless. It is therefore not 
surprising that logical positivists regarded any 
discussion of the existence of the physical world 
(roughly speaking ontological discussions) as 
“meaningless pseudo-problems” (Schlick, 1932). 
More specifically, Schlick’s point was not to make 
a claim about whether there is a reality; rather, his 
claim was that the entire discussion of this matter 
is meaningless.26 Carnap (1963b, p. 868) declared 
that, for the Vienna positivists, “The statement 
asserting the reality of the external world (realism) 
as well as its negation in various forms . . . are 
pseudo-statements” by definition. 
4.9 Precise Concepts and LP 
The IS belief that LP valued precise concepts is partly 
correct. LP valued precision in terms of requiring that 
metaphysics must be removed from scientific 
sentences and that all terms in empirical sentences 
must have observable characteristics. The claim that 
LP concerns precise concepts is partly correct in the 
sense that having identifiable terms requires that 
concepts are precisely defined or well known. 
However, precise concepts are not automatically 
moon.” Roughly speaking, here Schlick provide an example 
of a “scientific” proposition, which is tantamount to 
meaningful in the terminology of LP. For Schlick’s (1932) 
LP, all theories were broken down to individual propositions, 
which were verified individually. For LP, theory could be 
just one proposition. For Schlick’s LP, synthetic (empirical) 
propositions that did not contain verifiable terms were 
regarded as meaningless (nonsense) and not scientific. 
Schlick’s example of an acceptable scientific proposition is 
“there is a 3000 meter mountain on the other side of the 
moon” (p. 484). As can be seen, this mountain proposition 
does not refer to mountains in general, it refers to one specific 
mountain, and the specific or unique characteristics of that 
mountain (3000 meters). In his example, Schlick does not 
require that this observation has to be generalized to other 
mountains. This example implies that Schlick, the founder of 
LP, regarded the examination of unique aspects as 
scientifically acceptable.  
26  Schlick’s position on realism is complex. One 
interpretation is that Schlick is a realist (cf. “only the given 
is real”; Schlick, 1932), but he nevertheless regarded the 
discussion on realism (and issues thereof) as a meaningless 
pseudoproblem, which should be avoided. There are other 
possible interpretations, but they cannot be discussed here. 




scientific (meaningful) for LP—i.e., one could have 
precise definitions that are meaningless. 
4.10  Logical Positivists were not Passive, 
Neutral, or Value-Free Thinkers 
It is understandable that the IS literature regards LP as 
a neutral, passive, and value-free approach to science. 
The idea of LP seems to approach neutrality: Can you 
prove your proposition mathematically or assert a 
scientific statement that can be verified? While this 
activity may appear value-free, LP itself was not value-
free. LP suggested regarding metaphysics as meaningless, 
for example, which was far from being a value-free aim 
(Laudan, 1983). Carnap admitted that in attempting to 
discard metaphysics, he was targeting the philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger (Diesing, 1991), thus constituting a 
value-laden objective. In addition, the Vienna Circle 
positivists were not themselves passive observers. Carnap 
(1963a, p. 32) claimed that the members of the Vienna 
Circle were socialists and advocated scientific humanism.  
Neurath noted that all sciences are based on a number 
of values and that value-free science is not necessary 
(Cat, 2014), adding that in the social and natural 
sciences, scholars are not passive observers. His 
examples were self-fulfilling prophecies. The point 
was that human beings are intentional, and they change 
their behavior; moreover, scientists’ interventions or 
results can also change humans’ behavior.27  
4.11  The Claim that Social Sciences 
Should Emulate the Natural Sciences 
Another fundamental belief that pertains to the 
meaning of positivism for some IS scholars is that the 
social sciences should emulate the natural sciences, for 
example, methodologically (e.g., Ngwenyama & Lee, 
1997; Lee, 1991; Lee & Hubona, 2009).  
We propose the following interpretation. For LP, the 
key was not the unity of the specific research methods 
that the scholars utilized (unless verification, protocol 
sentences, or observation are regarded as the method). 
The concern was, once again, with metaphysics.28 It 
was believed that different sciences may contain 
conflicting concepts, some of which could turn out to 
                                                     
27 E.g., a scientist who predicts that a meteorite will fall at a 
specific place at a certain time, thereby resulting in the death 
of numerous people (Reisch, 2001). Since merely stating the 
prediction may lead to people fleeing the area (Reisch, 2001), 
a scholar’s statements can influence human action. 
28 The LP “unity of science” discussion also related to the 
manner in which different scientific domains connect with 
each other to form a framework of united science. Carnap 
and Neurath advocated opposite views. Carnap proposed a 
hierarchical structure of sciences, with physics being the 
fundamental science and located at the base of the hierarchy. 
Neurath did not accept the primacy of physics and suggested 
an encyclopedia-like model in which the different sciences 
be metaphysical (von Wright, 1945). Such metaphysics 
could be avoided if all sciences were translated into a 
common “metaphysics-free” neutral language (von 
Wright, 1945; Tamminga, 2005). Logical positivists, 
however, disagreed on the details.29 
5 Implications 
The extent to which LP is useful for IS without careful 
and justified modifications is questionable. Nevertheless, 
provided that positivism is used to justify certain research 
orientations in IS, we first highlight two general 
implications for IS regarding positivism:  
First, generally speaking, what has been justified as 
scientific by positivism in IS either was not required by 
logical positivists, or was regarded as nonsense by 
logical positivists. Influential IS articles on positivism 
present positivism as requiring statistical techniques, 
statistical generalizability, generalizability across 
different settings (as opposed to “single-setting” 
studies), independent and dependent variables, and the 
outlining of ontological stances. We argue that these 
were not required by logical positivists, or they were 
regarded as nonsense by logical positivists. 
Second, many research orientations that are deemed 
“unscientific” in IS by the authority of positivism are, 
in fact, “scientific,” in principle, according to LP30. In 
IS, positivism is used to deem certain practices 
“unscientific”—e.g., “positivism requires the social 
sciences to incorporate these elements [independent 
and dependent variables, quantitative data, inferential 
statistics, experimental] if they are to become as 
scientific as natural sciences” (Lee & Hubona, 2009, p. 
237). The problem is that no such things were 
explicitly required by the positivist philosophers for 
the research to be scientific.  
If the role of the model for science is LP, then things 
like “the positivist conception of generalizability, 
which pertains to generalizing a theory across different 
settings” (Lee & Baskerville, 2003, p. 231), may not 
be required. Moreover, if positivism is “the model for 
the social sciences to live up to” (Lee & Hubona, 2009, 
p. 238), then the single-setting observation study 
would seem to be acceptable in principle, and the 
were not supposed to be reduced to the laws of physics, as 
the pyramid model suggested (Neurath, 1937; Uebel, 2010). 
29  Neurath (1932) worried that such a neutral universal 
language would itself be metaphysical. He also believed that 
no neutral language exists; all views are always imperfect 
because they are biased by our preconceptions. Carnap 
(1937) later rejected the idea of one language; he felt that 
there could be multiple different languages for each science. 
He also noted that the selection of the language was a totally 
subjective choice. 
30 Obviously, if we apply the strict requirement of absolute 
verification or analytic/synthetic, then perhaps no empirical 






preferred method (if there is one) would seem to be 
qualitative observations recorded by field notes. In 
addition, if positivism is the role model for IS or social 
sciences, then no statistical methods would be required.  
Moreover, our earlier analysis showed that the 
“successor” of LP—namely, LE—with which it is 
sometimes confused, is also a highly questionable 
foundation for many natural sciences, not to mention 
social sciences (Diesing, 1991). Anyone advocating 
LE ideas in IS research must demonstrate how the 
accumulated evidence against LE philosophers can be 
overcome. For example, those scholars proposing the use 
of the deductive-nomological model of explanation in IS 
(Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948) should consider the 
critique of the model and how this critique applies to IS.31 
Finally, our review of positivism in IS reveals a 
concern that extends beyond positivism. Specifically, 
by and large, the IS authors list their positivistic 
assumptions without an attempt to justify them. For 
example, articles may state certain assumptions as 
positivistic or declare that positivists required 
independent and dependent variables or quantitative 
studies. However, these articles do not explain why 
these assumptions are positivistic and why they are 
justified or important in science/IS, other than that they 
are assumed to be positivistic. Following something 
without understanding why it is important, and what 
the strengths and weaknesses of such a view are, can 
constitute dogmatism, and IS research should be 
cognizant of this hazard. 
6 Conclusion 
LP is employed to authorize a number of research 
assumptions as “scientific” and deem another set of 
orientations as “unscientific.” However, the 
philosophy of positivism hardly provides a 
justification for many influential IS beliefs about 
positivism—including statistical or nonstatistical 
generalizability, surveys, independent and dependent 
variables, and declaring ontological views. As a result, 
many influential beliefs on IS positivism are debunked.  
In turn, many research orientations that IS positivism 
judges to be “unscientific” per LP (e.g., single-setting 
research, examination of change, qualitative research), 
would seem to be “scientific” according to LP. 
Furthermore, the use of positivism in IS calls for a 
further analysis of the fundamental beliefs of IS. An 
analysis of key concepts and beliefs is critical, as there 
is a risk that IS scholars may inappropriately utilize 
lofty philosophical concepts to determine what 
constitutes accepted, scientific, or high-quality 
research. When concepts are used in this way to 
demarcate or characterize what is considered to be 
good science, then they have the potential to not only 
direct research, but also to disregard important 
research that does not meet the assumed beliefs. For 
example, if we assume and teach our doctorate 
students that research must have static variables in 
order to be scientific, then we may omit change, may 
test our models one time only, or we may abstract our 
models from the phenomenon so much that the results 
finally look static in the end. But what happens if the 
IS phenomena are not static, but highly dynamic? In 
such circumstances, our assumptions that scientific 
research must focus on fixed static variables could 
seriously hinder the progress of IS research and 
decrease practical applicability. Realizing that certain 
influential, taken-for-granted assumptions underlying 
IS research are unwarranted, could have ground-
breaking implications for future IS research. 
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